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The accelerated path of technological development, particularly at the interface between hardware
and biology has been suggested as evidence for future major technological breakthroughs associ-
ated to our potential to overcome biological constraints. This includes the potential of becoming
immortal, having expanded cognitive capacities thanks to hardware implants or the creation of
intelligent machines. Here I argue that several relevant evolutionary and structural constraints
might prevent achieving most (if not all) these innovations. Instead, the coming future will bring
novelties that will challenge many other aspects of our life and that can be seen as other feasible
singularities. One particularly important one has to do with the evolving interactions between hu-
mans and non-intelligent robots capable of learning and communication. Here I argue that a long
term interaction can lead to a new class of “agent” (the humanbot). The way shared memories get
tangled over time will inevitably have important consequences for both sides of the pair, whose
identity as separated entities might become blurred and ultimately vanish. Understanding such
hybrid systems requires a second-order neuroscience approach while posing serious conceptual
challenges, including the definition of consciousness.
Keywords: Singularity, evolution,social interacting robots,major transitions,mind,memory,ageing
Can a machine think? Could it have pain?
Ludwing Wittgenstein
I. INTRODUCTION
The beginnings of the 21-st century have been marked
by a rapid increase in our understanding of brain organ-
isation and a parallel improvement of robots as embod-
ied cognitive agents (Steels 2003; Cangelosi 2010; Nolfi
and Mirolli 2009; Vershure et al 2014). This has taken
place along with the development of enormously powerful
connectionist systems, particularly within the domain of
convolutional neural networks (Lecun et al 2015; Kock
2015). Two hundred years after the rise of mechanical
automata, that became the technological marvels of the
Enlightnment (Woods 2003) new kinds of automata are
emerging, capable of interacting with humans in adap-
tive ways. The requirements for building an intelligent
or a conscious machine are likely to be still ahead in
the future, but some advances and new perceptions of
the problem are placing the possibility at the forefront
of ”what-if” questions (Vershure 2016). To a large ex-
tent, today’s discussion on what separates humans from
their artificial counterparts is deeply tied to the prob-
lem of how to properly define mind and consciousness
(Zarkadakis 2015).
In the 1950s, the development of cybernetics by Nor-
bert Wiener and others along with the beginning of the-
oretical neuroscience and Turing’s proposal for an intel-
ligence test (Turing 1950) were received with a similar
interest, triggering a philosophical debate on the limits
and potential of man-made imitations of life (Nourbakhsh
2013). The study of the first ”cybernetic machines” made
by a few pioneers such as Gray Walter generated a great
expectation. For the first time ”behaviour” emerged as
a word associated to mechanical machines, this time em-
powered by the rising technology that allowed to com-
bine hardware and a new form of engineering inspired
-to some extent- by natural devices (Water 1950, 1951;
see also Braitenberg 1984). Those early experiments pro-
vided some interesting insights into the patterns of explo-
ration of simple agents that where able to detect edges,
respond to light and modify their movements according
to some simple feedback mechanisms. Although their
simple behaviour was essentially predictable, it was not
completely free from surprise (Holland 1997). Later work
in the 1990s and afterwards incorporated artificial neural
systems as an explicit form of introducing learning and
behaviour largely inspired in biology (Vershure et al 1992;
Edelman 1992; Sporns and Alexander, 2002; Prescott et
al 2006).
Nowadays we are rapidly moving towards a new gener-
ation of domestic, human-friendly robots that will proba-
bly trigger a new technological revolution, similar in some
ways to the one proposed by the first personal computers.
There is a great promise in this revolution. The promise
of robots helping us, playing with us or simply having
some basic support functions is pushing forward software
and hardware companies towards designing cheap robotic
systems. For the general public the fascination remains
in the humanoids, those who really look like us. We
are actually witnessing a rehearsal of the mechanical au-
tomata mania of the 18th century, except that the new
automata will be much more autonomous and perhaps
closer to us than ever. Not surprisingly, the rise of the
new robots has come about with a parallel growth of new
fields associated to human-robot interactions (Breazeal
2003; Fong et al 2003; Dautenhahn 2007) and the ex-
ploration of learning, cognition and evolution potentials
of artificial agents (Clark and Grush 1999; Schaal 1999;
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FIG. 1 Humans and robots have been interacting in increasingly more complex ways, most of them limited to simple tasks.
However, communicating robots (a) could in the future interact in deeper ways both among them and with humans (image
courtesy of Luc Steels -the human in the picture- and the Neurocybernetics group at Osnabruck). Fictional stories on future
human-robot interactions, including (b) the movie Robot and Frank or (c) TV series Humans have started to consider the
relevance of strong emotional ties established between elderly or impaired human beings and (possibly non-intelligent) robots
capable of learning and communicating through natural language. Evolving connectomes will inevitably result from HRI (d).
The long-term association between a human and a robotic agent, when the later is equipped with both communication skills
and learning capacities implies the creation of an association network Γ linking both ”brains” through a number of shared
memories. The relative importance of this shared connectome will be a function of the cognitive apparatus of each partner and
the depth of emotional engagement.
Floreano and Mattiusi 2008; Takeno 2013).
Along with the science and engineering of these human-
like agents, science fiction is also exploring some relevant
(and sometimes unexpected) consequences of these near
futures. Most early works on robots have been centered
on the possibility of intelligent, or even self-aware ma-
chines. Isaac Asimov published the Sci-Fi classic I robot
three years before Turing’s landmark paper on intelli-
gence, picturing a would-be society where robots become
a central part of our lives (Asimov 1947). Perhaps the
most interesting reflection of Asimov’s tales is the un-
expected, the unforeseen consequences of robotic actions
while interacting with their most complex part of the en-
vironment: us, the humans. The robots incorporate a set
of hardwired rules (the ”laws” of robotics) preventing the
machines from harming humans and harming themselves
but in special contexts, when a conflict among the laws
emerges, the unexpected should be expected.
The scientific progress made in the field of human-
robot interactions (HRI) and artificial intelligence (AI)
have renewed the interest in the potential consequences
of advanced cognitive robots (Wallach and Allen, 2009;
Bradshaw et al., 2004; Murphy and Woods, 2009) and
in particular the role played by embodiment in commu-
nicating agents (figure 1a) which is known to play a key
role in the development of complex behavioural traits
(Steels 2003, 2015). The plots in new Sci-Fi stories have
become more subtle, and much more interesting. In the
movie Robot and Frank, for example, we have a moving
story of a declining man (Frank) facing the initial phases
of Alzheimer’s and a robot companion which, despite a
lack of real intelligence, shares experiences and memo-
ries with his human partner (fig 1b). At some point,
the robot asks Frank to wipe out his memories. Frank
rejects the idea, while the robot tells him ”I am not a per-
son, I am just an advanced simulation” but afterwards
he uses a number of very personal (Frank-like) sentences
to make his argument, resulting from previous learned
3talks and experiences. A related situation also shows
up in an episode of the Sci-Fi series Humans where Dr
George Millican, an elderly man and one of the main
characters, owns a faulty robot named Odi (fig 1c). The
boy-like robot is an old model that stores memory chunks
of shared, unique experiences, some of them related to de-
ceased Millican’s wife. Because of this, Millican does not
accept the mandatory replacement of old models, thus
hiding Odi inside a closet.
None of the previous examples is related to truly in-
telligent robots. Instead, the subtle ties and their conse-
quences arise from shared cognition and emotions. Nowa-
days, despite our distance from the sci-fi proposals, robot
designs are already present in a wide range of situations
where they are social partners. This includes house-
hold pets, healthcare assistants or even educational com-
panions. Even when the robotic agent has a limited
repertoire of interactions, its actions can be perceived
as part of some ”personality”, particularly in relation
with robotic pets (Min Lee et al 2006; Li and Chignell
2010; Miklosi and Gacsi 2012; Park et al 2012). One goal
of robotic research is the development of autonomous
robots, capable of perception but also of making deci-
sions by themselves and more importantly to communi-
cate (Breazeal 2002; 2003; Breazeal et al 2016). Here sev-
eral levels of complexity are possible, from programmed
agents responding to a more or less simple and pre-
dictable environment to robots capable of complex inter-
actions with humans, able to use natural language and
learn from experience. The later scenario implies sophis-
ticated implementations grounded in neurorobotics (Ar-
bib et al 2006; Oztop et al 2006; Arbib et al 2008). One
goal of this paper is actually provide a general space of
HRI complexity where different classes of interactions can
be located.
As will be argued in the next section, these shared
memories and other common relationships define a net-
work of interactions describing the HRI that can con-
tribute, but also replace, parts of the brain functions
(figure 1d). This diagram displays an idealised bipartite
system (Γ) including both the human cognitive network
(Γh, the brain) and the artificial neural network embed-
ded in the robotic agent (Γr). The whole network Γ will
change in time as changes in the two subnetworks occur
but also through the creation of all levels of correlations
emerging from the HRI. What happens when this net-
work is the outcome of a long-term exchange? What are
the consequences for a HR pair when the human node is
affected by some kind of impairment? As will be argued
below, by considering the relative cognitive complexities
of each agent in this HRI and the influence of the de-
gree of emotional engagement, a space of HRI can be
defined following the approach of second-person neuro-
science (Schlibach et al 2013). Within this space of pos-
sibilities, one in particular can involve the emergence of
a new class of cognitive agent transcending both humans
and robots, perhaps defining a novel form of synthetic
evolutionary transition (Sole´ 2016). The consequences of
such novel hybrid system will be discussed.
II. THE SPACE OF HUMAN-ROBOT INTERACTIONS
Here we are interested in the problem of how a so-
cially interacting robot can trigger emotional and even
cognitive changes in the human partner. In order to do
so we need to take into account several components of
this interaction, which is mediated by a complex net-
work of exchanges and could be described in the con-
text of distributed adaptive control theory (see Lallee and
Vershure 2015). Two major groups of HRI interactions
can be defined here. This first involves those scenarios
where interactions are short-lived (the robot companion
exchanges take place over a small time window) or pre-
dictable (the robot is programmed for simple tasks). The
second instead incorporates robotic agents that can learn
from experience and interact through long time spans. A
major difference between the two cases, in terms of the
HRI is the absence and presence of emotional engage-
ment (EE). The choice of EE as a key axis in our ap-
proach is grounded in previous studies on second-person
neuroscience (Schlibach et al 2013). In this field, the key
assumption is that an active social engagement between
two (or more) individuals is fundamentally different from
a mere observation of subjects. Within our context, we
will distinguish between a situation of low EE where the
two partners in a HRI are essentially independent from
another one where each agent shapes others cognition.
The space of HRI proposed here is summarised in fig-
ure 2a, where three axes have been used to locate differ-
ent classes of robotic agents. In a way, this can be seen as
the landscape of human-robot interactions. It provides a
tentative picture of the diverse array of qualitative classes
of HRI. Three axes are introduced, namely: the degree of
cognitive complexity of robots and humans and a third
axis linked to the emotional engagement, resulting from
both a long-term interaction and the potential for learn-
ing and adaptation displayed by the robot. As shown in
figure 2b and 2c, we can decompose this space, which we
have partitioned in eight arbitrary combinations, in two
main layers including low and high emotional ties. Below
we present and discuss these two layers separately.
A. Low emotional engagement
In this level of engagement, robots are typically asso-
ciated to simple tasks with low (if any) of cognitive com-
plexity and playing the role of decision-making systems
exhibiting low communication skills (figure 3b). Most
standard socially interacting robots (at least the first
generations of them) fall in this domain. The typical sce-
nario is a programmed artificial agent that can perform
predictable tasks and is expected to operate in simple
environments.
Humans (from toddlers to adults) interacting with sim-
4ple robots (such as toys or automata following simple
orders) would define a lower bound of low cognitive com-
plexity for both agents. Cleaning robots such as Roomba
and receptionist robots answering requests from clients
(giving simple types of information) would be obvious
examples, although even in this case the use of personal-
ization toolkits triggers emotional connections (Sung et
al 2009).
In this domain, robots with high cognitive skills inter-
acting with cognitively impaired individuals over specific
tasks give the last option in our list. Robots can help in
providing support to the elderly or impaired in ways that
do not require learning potential from the artificial agent
side. Robots capable of identifying the needs of their
human partners can be helpful even if not emotionally
engaged, while robots with a large amount of available
data sets can be interesting as expert systems with user-
friendly (humanoid) interfaces. Instead we weight cogni-
tion in terms of (pre-programmed) diverse repertoires of
responses.
Agents and operative systems exhibiting a rich reper-
toire of interactions, such as SIRI (which can assist blind
people) or Alexa would fit the high-cognitive complex-
ity corner. Here of course ”cognition” does not have the
meaning that can be attributed to a neural system. For
some of these non-embodied systems, a very large reper-
toire of potential answers can be communicated with the
help of a natural language interface. The success of some
systems such as Watson, which was trained for a specific
goal (answering questions on the Jeopardy quiz show)
using hundreds of millions of webpages illustrate the po-
tential for surpassing humans in searching and solving
questions.
This layer and the next layer in our space, now allow-
ing higher emotional engagement, are not clear cut. This
is particularly relevant if we take into account the human
tendency to extract behavioural or emotional clues from
the interaction with even simple computer programs. It
is worth remembering that even the earliest attempts to
program machines (Weizenbaum 1966) capable for an-
swering questions, such as ELIZA (which used pattern
matching to simulate a conversation) led to rather unex-
pected reactions (Weizenbaum 1976). ELIZA was sup-
posed to imitate a speaking psychiatrist, essentially cre-
ating simple responses triggered by key words that were
then used to create simple questions. But in many cases,
people failed to believe they were talking with a computer
(which was far beyond in computer power from anything
existing today). Similarly, some robots can be simple
companions if their interactions span a short time scale
but create a strong bond (from human to machine) with
their owners if interactions occur over long, shared peri-
ods of time. To reach the second layer, we must allow
artificial agents to learn and adapt in flexible ways, as
well as be capable of exhibiting and detecting emotions.
B. High emotional engagement
Long-term relationships in HRI can lead to a rather
distinct set of patterns that strongly depart from the
previous layer. Here we consider the possibility that the
robotic agents have been interacting with a given individ-
ual in a flexible manner and over an extended period of
time. Such interaction might occur at different levels and
this too is strongly dependent on the relative cognitive
complexity or each partner (the human and the robot)
as well as the level and span of their emotional interac-
tion. A healthy, adult human brain is a highly complex
system that can nevertheless engage in an emotionally
strong relationship with a pet. Humans and dogs (and
other pets) have been co-evolving over hundreds of thou-
sands of years until today, where our animal companions
have limited cognition powers but a highly developed set
of skills associated to emotion recognition (Hare et al
2002). One side effect of this process is our tendency to
generate empathy for non-living objects resembling pets.
These evolutionary responses have left a detectable cog-
nitive signal (Stoeckel et al 2014). What has been the
outcome of HRI between human and artificial pets? A
first glimpse of the implications of long-term exchanges
between humans and pet robots capable of learning was
provided by AIBO dogs, used as companions in a broad
range of conditions, from preschool children to elder pa-
tients (Kahn et al 2006, Melson et al 2009). In the fu-
ture, these type of pets (as well as those emerging from
the Virtual reality world) are likely to become the rule
rather than the exception (Rault 2015).
Despite the lack of a complex communication, the do-
mestication of dog’s cognition has lead to emotional ties
that can be strong. All studies on HRI involving robotic
pets reveal that human perception is markedly biased to-
wards perceiving them as life-like entities and treated as
such, instead as artifacts (Kahn et al 2006). This creates
a number of interesting situations relevant for the prob-
lem addressed here, an in particular the blurring of lines
between ontological categories. As a consequence, emo-
tional ties and their consequent effects are likely to be
shared. Such effects are enhanced by the development
of some ”personality” associated to robot learning ca-
pacities, which can strengthen emotional ties. These dif-
ferential behaviours result from the historical sequence of
HRI events: by tapping AIBO’s head sensor after a given
behavioural display, it is possible to enforce or decrease
a given response, but each case and how it relates with
other responses will depend on each specific HRI. Among
other things, the loss of a pet can trigger a strong reac-
tion in the human, but also in the animal end of the
tie. Perhaps not surprisingly a similar situation has been
emerging in relation with AIBO owners who, unable to
repair their old dog robots, have to accept their ”death”
and eventually organise funerals not different from those
made for the living counterparts. In this case, the hu-
man and the robot are separated by a huge cognitive
complexity gap, but the capacity of the robot for learn-
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FIG. 2 The cognitive space of H-R interactions under the two-agent perspective taken here. Non-robotic systems (such as
ELIZA, SIRI or Watson) are also included. The axes represent (in a qualitative ordering) emotional engagement as well as
two dimensions associated to the complexity displayed by the human and the artificial agents, respectively. Here the relative
location of each system needs to be taken as indicative. Some of these robots appear in the high human cognitive complexity
domain, mainly because their full operational function is expected to take place here, although they could in principle be
useful in the other side of the cognition space. The domain where humanbot systems would emerge is indicated by a blurred
sphere. A broad array of possible HRI pairs could be expected here, involving strong cognitive dependences that could generate,
particularly when the human side is impaired, a new class of cognitive agent.
ing and somewhat adopt some personality makes a big
difference for their owners.
The previous example would correspond to the possible
interactions in the lower part of our space (figure 2c) as-
sociated with low robotic cognition. A relevant scenario
is the interaction between elderly patients requiring care
and therapy (the so called fourth age) and some robots,
such as Paro: an artificial, seal-shaped agent. Paro is
equipped with sensors detecting touch, light, sounds or
movement, with motors and actuators and other stan-
dard robotic features but also with some additional fea-
tures such as responses to cuddling and a constant seek-
ing of eye contact. Additionally, several emotions have
been programmed and it can respond to its own name
as well as learn other names. Paro has been used in
treatment of patients with dementia. The result of these
interactions was a reduction of anxiety and helping re-
cover from chronic ailments as well as improving com-
munication with other patients and often creating strong
attachments (Kidd et al 2006, Takayanagi et al 2014).
Similar patterns have been found using AIBO (Melson
et al 2009).
Most companion robots helping patients with dementia
are programmed to respond to specific tasks in a more or
less flexible way. On a basic level, the robot can be very
useful by reminding the human the name and/or location
of objects. This has been proposed as a memory pros-
thetics for elders (Ho et al 2013) where the robotic com-
panion would be equipped with a visual episodic mem-
ory, but consider now a HRI capable of learning and us-
ing natural language. On another level, it can serve as a
medium to communicate with other humans and prevent-
ing isolation. Similarly, if capable of moving in outdoors
environments, it could greatly improve orientation. But
what if the artificial agent is equipped with a powerful
cognitive system beyond simple reactions and capable of
dealing with daily living environments using multimodal
integration learning? Here deep neural networks can play
a fundamental role, including the use of natural language
(Noda et al 2014).
Consider a robotic agent capable of maintaining a con-
versation, using natural language, and capable of gath-
ering relevant information concerning past events related
with the life of the patient, detecting goals and wishes
as well as emotions and capable also of facial expression
to share emotional states. This would also be a very de-
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sirable form of interaction, since the loss of memories or
-more generally- the difficulties to access stored recollec-
tions can be a great source of stress for elder people with
mild cognitive impairment1 and Alzheimer’s patients in
particular, specially in early phases of the disease. An ar-
tificial agent capable of coping with memory decay and
disorientation by means of verbal communication would
leverage the anxieties associated to cognitive decline and
improve reasoning and judgement. If flexible enough, a
1 This refers usually to a transition stage between a normal process
of brain ageing and dementia, characterised by low performance
in memory tasks
neural agent can learn how to help the human in the
most useful and personalised way. And here comes the
problem.
The HRI involved here leads to a rather unique out-
come. For example, if the artificial agent provides sup-
port to losses in episodic memory, a first paradoxical
situation might emerge: it can occur that some events
become absent from the impaired brain while they re-
main stored within the artificial agent. Such stored rec-
ollections can be easily over-interpreted by the artificial
agent, in particular their relative value and potential cor-
relations among different memories. On a general level,
reminding the human subject where are the lost keys or a
misplaced wallet are simple and yet important tasks that
can easily counterbalance or alleviate early symptoms.
7But it can also have a major impact on autobiographical
memory. This class of memory, associated to the left pre-
frontal cortex, provides the basis for putting together a
timeline of past events connected to visual and sensory-
perceptual features. We should have in mind that a ma-
jor limitation of robotic agents (and a crucial component
of the human mind, Suddendorf 2013) is their lack of
understanding or representation of time.
The agent, if properly equipped with visual recogni-
tion systems, can have seen pictures of family members
(alive or not) and learned about their stories from the pa-
tient. These stories can be true or not, but in both cases
the agent will contribute to store and recover them. A
great advantage of any neural-based system capable of
pattern recognition and generalisation (as deep learning
networks, see LeCun et al 2015, and references therein)
is that the robot can extract correlations required to
help in more complex tasks, particularly in relation to
episodic, semantic and working memory as well as lan-
guage and executive functioning. But these correlations
rely on both the (possibly faulty) input provided by the
human and the emotional weight given to each memory
by both partners within the HRI. Because correlations
are likely to be generated from biased perceptions, the
resulting internal correlation matrix created by the robot
(and returned to the human through HRI events) can de-
part from the original correlations generated in the brain.
If we take into account that memories themselves are
not reliable (this in particular affects priming) the long-
term HRI inevitably leads to considerable deviations
from the original memory web. In this respect, we have a
first glimpse of an anomalous pattern: potential memory
deficits are compensated by the reliable storage of infor-
mation residing in the artificial neural network, which can
use false memories, create incorrect (but strong) correla-
tions associated to emotional events and feed-back them
into the mind of the human. Can this process lead to a
runaway amplification phenomenon? What seems likely
to occur is that mismatches between the relevance and
emotional weight associated to different memory patterns
and their interactions might promote deep distortions of
the memory and behavioral landscapes. As the HRI pro-
ceeds, a new set of interactions will coalesce between the
human connectome Γh (figure 1d) and the network of
neural correlations created within the robot brain (Γr).
The whole cognitive map must be found in the merged
structure Γ that includes both networks along with all the
human-robot correlations that have emerged and that we
also indicate as links between areas.
The loss of plasticity that results from ageing or dam-
age reinforces dependencies among human and robotic
cognitive maps mediated by co-occurrence patterns. The
view of a given object or image elicits a response in both
sides that defines effectively an interaction between both,
since these responses will immediately lead to an informa-
tion exchange. Consider for example a picture of someone
(or any other representation of it) that is identified by the
human and also stored by the robotic companion. Pre-
vious exchanges will have weighted the relevance of this
picture and the associated subnetwork of related objects,
people or actions.
As cognitive impairment grows in time, the relative
importance of the object representation within the arti-
ficial system might have been enhanced beyond its origi-
nal relevance, while exciting and reinforcing other related
subnetworks. If decisions or actions derive from this per-
ception, the loss of proper decision making by the human
might have been displaced towards the robot, thus shift-
ing the deep correlates from one agent to the other and
helping to preserve episodic and semantic memory. Al-
ternatively, different perception and decision layers might
become segregated between them. If the memory of this
specific image is gone from the human, it can neverthe-
less remain accessible in the artificial side, which would
now contain part of the autobiographical memory.
Since other related events connected to this memory
might indirectly interact with the brain network, it is pos-
sible that novel forms of hybrid memory might emerge.
However, despite the positive side of keeping otherwise
erased memories, the dynamics associated to the forma-
tion of the HR network can easily shift the importance of
events over time and even disrupt it. Unless under some
external supervision by close relatives of the patient, the
humanbot can lead to a shared mind that strongly de-
parts from the organisation and coherence of the origi-
nal subject. In other words, one outcome of this HRI is
the conscious experience of a different subject, like living
in the mind of someone else. The humanbot is a likely
outcome of future HRI and its potential to become real
is tied to the new generations of robots equipped with
powerful learning systems and high memory capacities.
These robots might be not yet here, but they are certainly
much closer than the coming of intelligent machines.
III. DISCUSSION
The increasing frequency of dementias, being
Alzheimer’s the most common one, will affect millions
of human beings in the next decades (Reitz et al 2011).
While prevention strategies are developed and new drugs
are been tested, the need to caregivers helping these pa-
tients is becoming a major issue. Beyond the staggering
economic costs, caregivers (often family members) are
also affected by strong physical and emotional stress.
In many cases, their health is also deteriorated. The
possibility of using a robotic agent providing help seems
a desirable option, although ethical issues need to be
considered (Ienca et al 2016). Because cognitive decay is
a central issue in most cases, the artificial agent should
be equipped with a flexible, adaptive system capable of
dealing with changing conditions and specific needs. But
such plasticity and learning potential can generate new
emergent phenomena. In this paper we have explored
the potential outcomes of long-term HRI with artificial
agents able to replace memory deficits and communicat-
8ing through a natural language interface. As discussed
above, the increasing replacement of faulty cognitive
networks is likely to create a profound dependency of the
human companion that can eventually end in a blurred
boundary between the robot and the brain.
There are other implications derived from this class of
long-term HRI:
(a) The theory of attractor neural networks (Amari
and Maginu 1988; Amit 1992; Rojas 2013) has shown
that the qualitative responses of neural networks concern-
ing their responses to noise, memory potential and other
properties can experience sharp changes as some param-
eters are tuned. One particular example is the rapid
decline of associative memory as the neural network is
damaged beyond a given threshold. Similarly, the qual-
itative changes associated to an mismatch between the
memory requirements and the available cognitive power
can lead to the emergence of spurious memory states that
is decoupled from the real repertoire of original memo-
ries. In all these cases, neural networks display different
phases separated by well defined phase transition points
(Amit 1992). If these results, grounded in simple neural
network models, can be extrapolated to our hybrid sys-
tem, we would expect to observe tipping points in the
cognitive organisation of memories and other key prop-
erties.
(b) human beings display awareness, while machines
(so far) do not. A relevant problem concerning con-
sciousness is how to define it and even how to measure
it (Tononi and Edelman 1998). Some efforts in this di-
rection suggest that a single parameter Φ could be de-
fined that can capture the degree of consciousness (Tononi
2012). Using this parameter, obtained from an informa-
tion theoretic approach, it has been argued that we can
to the least order different case studies, from animals to
impaired human brains or machines (Tononi and Koch
2015). An interesting outcome of this approach is the
suggestion that machines (in particular those based on
von Neumann architecture) are not conscious (Tononi et
al. 2016). Without discussing this conclusion, it seems
clear that the humanbot, by inhabiting the boundaries
between human and machine will also incorporate some
level of consciousness (as measured by Φ). Under the
conditions described above, we need to ask the impact of
the cognitive replacement associated to the increasing in-
terdependence and how is consciousness shared by both
parts.
(c) Once the human is gone, we should seriously eval-
uate what is left behind within the robot. As long term
interactions are likely to shape the robotic cognitive net-
work, some key components of the human’s mind might
remain there for inspection or preservation. Once de-
ceased, what is left can keep changing as other inputs
from the external world keep entering the system, thus
modifying or even erasing the previous stored memories.
What to do next? Should the capacity for inspecting the
environment be put on hold? Would the robot be ca-
pable of interacting with friends and close people of the
deceased in meaningful ways? Should the stored infor-
mation be preserved as the only relevant remain of the
gone mind?
One of the most interesting and puzzling components
of Asimov’s vision of a future with robots playing a ma-
jor role in our society was the existence of a novel re-
search field: robopsychology. Experts in this area had to
deal with the sometimes unexpected behavior of robots,
emerging from the conflicts associated to the there rules
of robotics and their inevitable interaction with a com-
plex external world. In the picture presented here, a
different (but related) class of robotic psychology might
emerge in the future. The interaction, merging and blur-
ring of behavioral patterns resulting from the HRI de-
scribed above defines an uncharted territory. Long before
machines might outsmart us or develop consciousness or
intelligent behaviour (Barrat 2013) we will need to either
face the rise of the humanbot or prevent it to happen.
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